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TAX COMMENT
TAXATION-INTERNAL REVENUE-INTERPRETATION AND APPLI-
CATION OF SECTION 302(d) OF REVENUE ACT OF 1926.-On October
18, 1918, and again on February 1, 1919, decedent transferred to the
Bankers Trust Company certain bonds for the benefit of his daughter
and her son. Contemporaneously he made similar transfers of bonds
to the same trustee for the benefit of his son and his son's daughter.
Thereafter, November 27, 1926, in order to make provision for two
children of his daughter born after the creation of these trusts, he
sent the trust company letters purporting to revoke the trusts of
which she was a beneficiary, to terminate the interest of all persons
therein and to direct it to deliver the principal and income to itself as
trustee according to a new deed then delivered. Each of the five
trust agreements included provisions governing the management,
investment and disposition of the principal and income, and contained
a paragraph reserving to the donor power, at any time, to alter or
modify the indenture and any or all of the trusts in any manner, but
expressly excepting any change in favor of himself or his estate.
Deceased died November 30, 1926. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue included in the gross estate the value of the property
described in the last deed and the petitioners sought redeterminafion.
Held, affirming Board of Tax Appeals, 23 B. T. A. 1016, and Circuit
Court of Appeals, 60 F. (2d) 73, that because of the reserved power
to alter and amend, §302(d) applied and included the corpus of all
the trusts in the gross estate. Porter, et a. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 288 U. S. 436, 53 Sup. Ct. 451 (1933).
The Revenue Act of 1926, §302, provides that the value of
decedent's gross estate shall be determined by computing the value,
at the time of his death, of all property, real or personal, tangible or
intangible, wherever situated * * * (a) To the extent of the interest
therein of the decedent at the time of his death, * * * (d) To the
extent of the interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof
was subject at the date of his death to any change through the exer-
cise of a power, either by the decedent alone or in conjunction with
any person to alter, amend, or revoke.' Subdivision (a) does not in
any way refer to or purport to modify (d), as was held in White v.
Erskine.2 And in view of the familiar rule that tax laws are to be
construed liberally in favor of taxpayers,3 it cannot be said that if it
'26 U. S. C. §1094 (a), (d).
247 F. (2d) 1014, 1016 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931). The Court, in this case,
seemed to be of the opinion that no new form of tax was intended by the
Revenue Act of 1926, §302(d), but that it was only "to the extent of the
intgrest" of decedent in the trust fund, and, at his death, that subdivision (d)
added anything to the value of the gross estate.
8 Shwab v. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529, 536, 42 Sup. Ct. 391 (1922) McKenna,
., "* ** it is to be remembered that we are dealing with a tax measure and
whatever doubts exist must be resolved against it"; Crocker v. Malley, 260
U. S. 717, 43 Sup. Ct. 95 (1922); Malley v. Howard, 281 Fed. 363 (C. C.
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stood alone, (a) would extend to the transfer brought into the gross
estate by (d) .4 Moreover, Congress has progressively expanded the
basis for such taxation.5 Comparison of §302 6 with corresponding
provisions of earlier acts warrants the conclusion that (d) is not a
mere specification of something covered by (a) but that it covers
something not included therein.7 The transfers under consideration
are undoubtedly covered by subdivision (d) in view of the fact that
the words "alter," "modify" and "amend" are disjunctively, not con-
junctively, used. "Here the donor retained until his death power
enough to enable him to make a complete revision of all that he had
done in respect to the creation of the trusts even to the extent of
taking property from the trustees and beneficiaries named and trans-
ferring it absolutely or in trust for the benefit of others." 8 So far as
concerns the tax here involved, the Court held,9 there is no difference
in principle between a transfer subject to such changes and one that
is revocable, and that, so construed, §302(d) is not repugnant to the
due process clauses of the Fifth Amendment.
M. W. D.
A. 1st, 1922); Empire Fuel Company v. Hays, 295 Fed. 704 (N. D. W. Va.
1924); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Northern Coal Company, 62 F.(2d) 742 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933) Doubt or ambiguity as to construction of statutes
levying taxes should be resolved in taxpayer's favor.
'United States v. Fields, 255 U. S. 257, 264, 41 Sup. Ct. 256 (1921).
Application of Section 202 a, b, of Revenue Act of 1916. It was here held that
property passing under a testamentary execution of a general power of appoint-
ment created prior to the Revenue Act of 1916 was not taxable either under
Section 202, subdivision a, as property in which decedent had an interest and
which was subject to the payment of debts and expenses of administration and
subject to distribution as part of his estate or, under subdivision b, as property
in which the decedent had an interest and which was transferred by him in
contemplation of death.
6Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126
(1929).
'REVENUE AcT OF 1926, 26 U. S. C. §1094.
' Cf. Chase National Bank v. United States, mipra note 5; Tyler v. United
States, 281 U. S. 497, 50 Sup. Ct. 356 (1930); Gwin v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 287 U. S. 224, 53 Sup. Ct. 157 (1932)..
' Instant case; Porter v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 289 U. S. 436,
53 Sup. Ct. 451, 453 (1933).
1 Ibid.
